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Abstract
The ultimate fate of life in a universe with accelerated expansion is considered. Previous work [J.D. Barrow, F. Tipler, The
Anthropic Cosmological Principle, Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1986; L.M. Krauss, G.D. Starkman, Astrophys. J. 531 (2000)
22] showed that life cannot go on indefinitely in a universe dominated by a cosmological constant. In this Letter we consider
instead other models of acceleration (including quintessence and Cardassian expansion). We find that it is possible in these
cosmologies for life to persist indefinitely. As an example we study potentials of the form V ∝ φn and find the requirement
n <−2.
 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
The question of the ultimate fate of life in an ex-
panding universe has been a subject of debate in the
physics community for over two decades [1]. In 1979,
Dyson [2] proposed a framework within which to dis-
cuss whether or not some form of life, material or oth-
erwise, can go on. At the time of his work the uni-
verse was assumed to be decelerating. However, in
the light of recent evidence that the universe is ac-
celerating, the conclusions of Dyson’s original work
deserve reinvestigation. Observations of Type IA Su-
pernovae [3,4] as well as concordance with other ob-
servations (including the microwave background and
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 Open access under CC BY license.galaxy power spectra) indicate that the universe is ac-
celerating. Hence the question of the future of life in
our universe deserves another look in the context of
this acceleration. Barrow and Tipler [5] and Krauss
and Starkman [6] followed the basic approach outlined
by Dyson to consider life in a universe dominated by a
cosmological constant. They concluded that life is in-
evitably doomed to oblivion in such a universe. Any
lifeform would eventually fry to death in the bath of
thermal Hawking radiation produced by the de Sitter
vacuum [6]. Beings of any kind generate heat by the
process of living and eventually are unable to dissipate
their heat in the background of this thermal bath.
In this Letter we consider the consequences of
other explanations for the acceleration of our universe.
Other than a cosmological constant, alternatives in-
clude a decaying vacuum energy [7,8], quintessence
[9–18], and Cardassian expansion [20] as possible ex-
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a time dependent vacuum energy given by a rolling
scalar field. Cardassian expansion is a model with mat-
ter and radiation alone (no vacuum at all) in which
acceleration is driven by a modified Friedmann–
Robertson–Walker (FRW) equation. The crucial dif-
ference between these cases and that of a cosmolog-
ical constant is that the temperature of the cosmo-
logical Hawking radiation decreases in time, in many
cases quickly enough to allow life to continue indef-
initely despite the presence of the thermal bath. We
consider two cases: (1) a constant equation of state
p = wρ with −1  w < −1/3 (which includes the
case of Cardassian expansion for constant exponent
n defined below), and (2) a time-varying equation of
state generated by a “quintessence” potential of the
form V (φ) ∝ φn with n < 0. In the case of constant
equation of state, we find that any equation of state
except a cosmological constant (w = −1) allows for
the indefinite continuation of life. In the quintessence
case, we find that any potential V ∝ φn with n <−2 is
consistent with the indefinite continuation of life. We
note at the outset that our arguments assume the ex-
istence of Hawking radiation in generic accelerating
spacetimes; while such Hawking radiation is plausible
(see, e.g., [21]), it existence has never been proven.1
If there is no such radiation, then these issues of life
burning up in the Hawking radiation become irrele-
vant, and it is even easier for some type of lifeform to
continue to exist.
In the conclusions, we discuss speculative sce-
narios in which life might avoid inevitable extinc-
tion even in the case of a universe dominated by a
cosmological constant, including quantum computa-
tion, oscillating universes, wormholes, and laboratory-
created universes. We also comment on the argu-
ment of Krauss and Starkman that the presence of a
quantum-mechanical ground state for the system ren-
ders Dyson’s argument invalid in general. We argue
that the inclusion of a cosmological Hawking temper-
ature in Dyson’s classical argument correctly captures
the quantum nature of the system and that therefore
Dyson’s conclusions are in fact valid.
1 We thank an anonymous referee as well as Gary Gibbons on
this point.2. The premise set out by Dyson
Dyson introduced the “biological scaling” hypoth-
esis to estimate the rate at which an organism in an en-
vironment of temperature T can perform computation.
We refer the reader to Ref. [2] for a definition and de-
tailed discussion of the scaling hypothesis, and instead
concentrate here on its relevant consequences. The im-
portant consequence of Dyson’s scaling hypothesis is
the notion of “subjective time”, i.e., the appropriate
measure of time as experienced by a living creature
is the quantity
(1)u(t)= f
t∫
t0
T (t ′) dt ′,
where T (t) is the temperature of the creature and
f = (300 deg s)−1 is introduced so as to make u
dimensionless.2 One can think of the quantity u as the
number of possible computations in a time t . We can
define one “computation” as some change of state in
a quantum system. Then a single computation, from
the energy/time uncertainty relation, takes place over
a characteristic timescale
(2)t  h¯
E
∼ h¯
kT
,
where k is Boltzmann’s constant. Then the total
number of computations u over time t is then
given by
(3)u
t
∝ kT
h¯
,
which leads directly to the definition of subjective
time in Eq. (1). (Later we comment on the possibility
of using quantum computation to alter this notion of
subjective time.) The continuation of life requires the
possibility of an infinite number of computations in a
system with only a finite amount of energy.
Dyson points out a second consequence of the
scaling law: any creature is characterized by a quantity
Q which measures its rate of entropy production per
unit of subjective time, dS =Qdu, in some sense the
2 The value of f suggested by Dyson is motivated by the fact that
human life takes place at 300 K with each moment of consciousness
lasting about a second; the precise value of f is immaterial to the
arguments.
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a human dissipating about 200 W of power at 300 K,
Q∼ 1023 bits. Krauss and Starkman estimate that the
uncertainty in this number suggests that a civilization
of conscious beings requires logQ > 50–100. Any
creature in the process of living and computing will
dissipate energy. A lifeform with given Q and given
temperature T will dissipate energy at a rate
(4)m≡ dE
dt
= kT dS
dt
= kfQT 2,
where m is the metabolic rate measured in ergs per
second. The total energy consumed by the creature is
then
(5)E = kfQ
t∫
t0
T 2(t ′) dt ′.
Since the rate of computation scales as T while the
rate of energy consumption scales at T 2, it at first
appears possible that an organism can perform an
infinite number of computations using a finite amount
of energy, as long as the operating temperature of
the organism continuously decreases in time, T (t) ∝
t−α , with 1/2 < α  1. We will refer to this as
Dyson’s condition: life can be considered “infinite” if
the number of computations, or “subjective time”, (1)
can be infinite while the total energy consumed (5) is
finite.
This naive analysis assumes that the organism is
completely free to choose its temperature T (t) so
as to satisfy Dyson’s condition. Several constraints
restrict this temperature. The creature must be able to
get rid of the heat E generated by the computations
it performs (4). However, Dyson estimates an upper
limit to the rate at which waste heat can be radiated as
(6)I (t) < 2.84 Nee
2
meh¯
2c3
(kT )3.
The creature will fry to death unless it can dissipate the
heat E that it creates; dissipation by radiation implies
a lower limit on the operating temperature for the
organism:
(7)T (t) > Tmin = (Q/Ne)× 10−12 K.
Since the ratio (Q/Ne) between the complexity of the
society and the number of electrons at its disposal
cannot be made arbitrarily small, there must be afinite minimum temperature for which computation
is possible. Therefore, Dyson’s condition cannot be
satisfied, and the creature or society cannot survive
indefinitely.
However, Dyson proposes a strategy to avoid this
sad conclusion: hibernation. Life may find a way to
metabolize intermittently, yet continue to radiate waste
heat into space during its periods of hibernation. The
society can remain active for a fraction g(t) of its time
while hibernating for the remaining 1− g(t) fraction
of the time. During these periods of hibernation,
metabolism can be effectively stopped while radiation
of waste heat continues. Then the total subjective time
is modified to
(8)u(t)= f
t∫
0
g(t ′)T (t ′) dt ′,
while the average rate of heat production by the
organism becomes
(9)m= kfQgT 2.
Therefore, the temperature of the organism can drop
below Tmin in Eq. (7) and the heat generated by the
computation can still be dissipated: the condition (7)
becomes
(10)T (t) > Tmin ≡ Q
Ne
g(t)× 10−12 K.
As long as the operating temperature of the organism
is above this limit, it can dispose of waste heat. The
total energy consumed is
(11)E = kfQ
t∫
t0
g(t ′)T 2(t ′) dt ′.
The organism is free to choose g(t) and T (t) to satisfy
Dyson’s condition. We will assume (consistent with
other authors) that g(t) ∝ T (t) ∝ t−p , the minimum
amount of hibernation consistent with the energy
dissipation condition (11). Then the subjective time is
given by
(12)u(t)∝
t∫
t0
(t ′)−2p dt ′,
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(13)E(t)∝
t∫
t0
(t ′)−3p dt ′.
Dyson’s condition
(14)u(t→∞)→∞, E(t→∞)→ const
is then satisfied for
(15)1
3
<p  1
2
.
An additional constraint is generated by the fact that
the creatures, even if hibernating, cannot cool off any
faster than the background universe. Hence, if the
universe temperature scales as
(16)Tu(t)∝ t−q ,
then this second constraint requires that
(17)p < q.
It is clear that Eqs. (15) and (17) can both be
simultaneously satisfied in a (decelerating) Cold Dark
Matter-dominated cosmology. There the temperature
of the background universe is given by the Cosmic
Microwave Background temperature, which scales in
a matter-dominated cosmology at TCMB ∝ t−2/3, i.e.,
q = 2/3. Hence the background temperature indeed
drops more quickly than the temperature required for
the organism to satisfy Dyson’s bound.
3. Cosmological constant dominated universe
Krauss and Starkman considered modifications to
these questions in the context of a universe dominated
by a cosmological constant Λ. In de Sitter space,
Hawking radiation creates a thermal bath of particles
at the de Sitter temperature,
(18)TdeS =
√
Λ
12π2
= const.
Hence the universe itself has a fundamental mini-
mum temperature, with q = 0. Then the constraint in
Eq. (10) is replaced by
(19)T (t) > Tmin ≡max
[
TdeS,
Q
N
g(t)× 10−12 K
]
.Therefore, no hibernation strategy will be sufficient to
satisfy Dyson’s condition. The first term in Eq. (19)
eventually dominates, and then Eq. (17) cannot be sat-
isfied with q = 0. Eventually thermal equilibrium will
be reached with everything at the Hawking tempera-
ture of the thermal bath, and further computation will
be an impossibility. Life in a universe with a cosmo-
logical constant is doomed to extinction.
4. Dark energy
The “dark energy” driving the acceleration of
the universe, however, need not be a cosmological
constant. In a more general scenario, the energy
density driving the acceleration can be variable in
time, or, equivalently, have an equation of state p >
−ρ. Acceleration takes place for any equation of state
p <−1/3ρ. In this section, we examine the case of a
more general equation of state and show that Dyson’s
condition for infinite computation can be met for a
wide range of accelerating cosmologies.
4.1. Constant equation of state
We first consider the simple case of equation
of state p = wρ, with w constant in time. Any
accelerating cosmology evolves toward flatness at late
time, so we can assume a flat cosmology. From the
Friedmann equation
(20)H 2 ≡
(
a˙
a
)2
= 8π
3m2Pl
ρ
and the Raychaudhuri equation
(21)
(
a¨
a
)
=− 4π
3m2Pl
(ρ + 3p),
we have, for w = const,
(22)dH
dt
=−3
2
(1+w)H 2.
For the case of a cosmological constant, w =−1 and
H = const, so that q = 0 and one can never satisfy
Eq. (17). Therefore, Dyson’s condition is violated.
However, for w >−1, we have H ∝ t−1. The Hawk-
ing temperature of the space (the generalization of
the de Sitter temperature in de Sitter space) therefore
also decreases as TH ∝ H ∝ t−1, i.e., q = 1. Then,
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than the second (∝ t−p), and one is back to Dyson’s
original condition in Eq. (10). As long as Eq. (15) is
satisfied, the Dyson condition that an infinite amount
of computation be possible with finite total energy ex-
pended can be met in any cosmology with w = const
except the special case of a cosmological constant,
w =−1.
4.2. Time-varying equation of state
In general, however, the equation of state of the
dark energy need not remain constant. We cannot
comment in general upon all time-varying equations
of state. We here concentrate upon the particular case
of “quintessence” models, in which the dark energy
consists of a slowly rolling scalar field. The time-
dependence of the equation of state depends on the
form of the potential for the quintessence field φ. The
equation of motion for a scalar field in a cosmological
background is
(23)φ¨ + 3Hφ˙+ V ′(φ)= 0.
The case of an exponential potential, V (φ) ∝ eφ/M
is just that of a constant equation of state considered
above, since
(24)a(t)∝ t1/&,
with & = const < 1 corresponding to accelerated
expansion. The equation of state is
(25)w = 2
3
& − 1= const.
This example can be generalized to an arbitrary
potential as follows. For a slowly rolling scalar field
φ, the equation of motion (23) is approximately
(26)3Hφ˙ −V ′(φ),
and the Friedmann equation is
(27)H 2 = 8π
3m2Pl
[
1
2
φ˙2 + V (φ)
]
 8π
3m2Pl
V (φ).
Then
(28)dH
dt
= 1
2
H
(
V ′(φ)
V (φ)
)
φ˙ =−&H 2,where the slow-roll parameter & is
(29)& = m
2
Pl
16π
(
V ′(φ)
V (φ)
)2
.
The exponential potential then has & = const as above,
but & varies with time for arbitrary potential. The
equation of state
(30)w  2
3
& − 1,
therefore varies in time as well. We consider the class
of potentials
(31)V (φ)∝ φn.
We first consider quintessence models with n < 0, so
that the universe is accelerating in the late-time limit.
The slow-roll parameter & is then
(32)& = n
2m2Pl
16π
(
1
φ2
)
∝H−4/n.
The equation of motion for the Hubble parameter is
(33)dH
dt
∝−H 2(n−2)/n,
with solution
(34)H(t)∝
[(
n− 4
n
)
t + const
]n/(4−n)
.
We are interested in the solution at late times, so
that for the quintessence case of n < 0, the Hubble
parameter and the Hawking temperature evolve as
(35)TH ∝H ∝ t−|n/(4−n)|
so that q = |n/(4− n)|. The Dyson condition requires
p < q as t →∞, where we are allowed to choose
p anywhere in the range 1/3 < p  1/2. Taking the
slowest rate of falloff for Tmin, we have the condition
(36)
∣∣∣∣ n4− n
∣∣∣∣>p > 13 ,
so that Dyson’s condition can be satisfied for quin-
tessence models with n <−2.
Some quintessence models, for example, those
based on light pseudo Nambu–Goldstone bosons [19],
take n > 0. In these models, the minimum of the po-
tential is at zero or negative energy and the accelerated
expansion generically ends at late times. In such a situ-
ation it is a simple matter to satisfy Dyson’s condition,
and we do not consider this case further here.
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An alternative way to drive acceleration of the uni-
verse is modification of the Friedmann–Robertson–
Walker equations. In Cardassian expansion [20], the
FRW equations become
(37)H 2 = 8π
3m2Pl
ρ +Bρn
with n < 2/3. In this model there is no vacuum term
at all, and the energy density ρ is simply given by
ordinary matter and radiation. The second term be-
comes more important as time goes on and for red-
shifts z < 1/2 drives acceleration of the universe. The
universe is thus flat, matter dominated, and accelerat-
ing in this model. An alternate way to modify the FRW
equations has been studied by [22]. For constant coef-
ficient n in the Cardassian model, the background evo-
lution of the universe behaves dynamically the same
as a constant equation of state w = n − 1 so that the
conclusion in the previous section implies that life can
persist in a universe with n > 0.
6. Conclusion and discussion
We have found that life can go on indefinitely in
an accelerating universe, depending on what energy
density drives the acceleration. Previous authors [5,6]
showed that the (time-independent) de Sitter radiation
in a cosmological constant driven expansion destroys
all life eventually. But in other cases we considered,
including quintessence and Cardassian expansion, we
found that the de Sitter radiation cools off just rapidly
enough to allow life to survive. In particular, for any
constant effective equation of state w = p/ρ > −1,
and any constant Cardassian exponent n > 0, life
can persist. In addition, we considered time-varying
equations of state for the case of a quintessence with
potential V ∝ φn, and found successful futures for life
if n <−2.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our arguments
have assumed the existence of Hawking radiation in
generic accelerating spacetimes. If there is no such
radiation, then these issues of life burning up in the
Hawking radiation become irrelevant, and it is even
easier for some type of lifeform to continue to exist.In this work we followed the basic premise set up
by Dyson. Currently we understand that there is a dis-
agreement between Dyson on the one hand and Krauss
and Starkman (KS) on the other hand as to whether
or not there is a flaw in the premise. KS argue that
any system in which computation is an irreversible
process must eventually reach a quantum-mechanical
ground state, beyond which further metabolism will
not be possible. If such a system is finite, it must nec-
essarily reach the ground state in finite time. We argue
that this line of reasoning is valid only in the limit of
a static (i.e., de Sitter) spacetime. Consider the phase
space available for quantum modes in an accelerating
spacetime. The horizon size dH ∼ H−1 provides an
infrared cutoff, since modes with momentum p < H
have wavelength longer than the horizon size, at which
point they become classical perturbations. Therefore,
the horizon size defines an effective ground state for
quantum modes in the spacetime, E > H . However,
this is exactly the physics which leads to the Hawking
temperature TdeS ∼ H ! In the case of exact de Sitter
space, the ground state energy is constant in time, and
therefore the argument of KS that any finite system
must relax to its ground state in finite subjective time
is valid. However, in backgrounds where the horizon
size is increasing in time, the “ground state” energy
defined by the infrared cutoff is decreasing in time and
the system continuously has new, lower-energy states
made available to it. Classically, this behavior is man-
ifest in the time-dependence of the Hawking temper-
ature. Thus the system can continue to radiate waste
heat and reaches a ground state only after infinite sub-
jective time, exactly as suggested by the classical cal-
culation. This argument is obviously speculative, and
it would be desirable to frame it in a more quantita-
tive way. In particular, it is not clear that a system with
these properties can truly be considered “finite”.
One might wonder if quantum computing would
allow us to modify the Dyson condition in a useful
way. Then the number of computations (the “subjec-
tive time”) given in Eq. (1) will be much larger for
a given rate of energy dissipation. A lifeform may
clearly continue to live or compute for a much longer
time period with the same energy consumption. How-
ever, it is straightforward to show that including quan-
tum computation as a possibility does not affect our
conclusions about the ultimate fate of life. The above
discussion was based on the thermodynamics of a con-
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m = fQkT 2 to “flip” Q bits at temperature T . We
can make an optimistic estimate of the increase in ef-
ficiency afforded by quantum computing by suppos-
ing that any operation performed on Q bits by a con-
ventional computer can be performed on a superpo-
sition of 2Q entangled quantum states by a quantum
computer, with identical energy consumption. Thus a
classical system with complexity Q can be built as a
quantum system with complexity log2(Q), which dis-
sipates energy at a rate
(38)mquant = f log2(Q)kT 2.
However, this improvement in efficiency alters the en-
ergy integral (11) by a multiplicative factor, and has
no effect on whether the total energy consumed is fi-
nite or infinite. Therefore, our arguments apply equally
well to quantum as well as classical computers. How-
ever, we note that an organism of a given complexity
Q can live exponentially longer in subjective time by
adopting quantum computing as a strategy.
We note that a finite system, while it may be
capable of an infinite amount of computation, is only
capable of storing a finite number of memories. As
long as the expansion of the universe is accelerating,
any system which is initially finite must remain so,
since any additional material with which to build new
“memory” has redshifted beyond the horizon and is
therefore unavailable. We thus reach the apparently
inescapable conclusion that, while life itself may be
immortal, any individual is doomed to mortality.
There are certainly limitations to Dyson’s premise.
One alternative cosmology which would violate
Dyson’s premise would be if the universe oscillates
[23–26] or is cyclic [27]. Then the current accelerating
phase might be followed by a subsequent recontraction
and then again an expansion, and life could begin all
over again. Of course the new burst of life might not
have any memory of our current cycle, so that this does
not provide an altogether satisfactory solution to the
problem of enabling life to continue indefinitely [2].
However, while it is not given to us to choose
what kind of universe we live in now, we do have
the freedom to improve our strategy for continued
existence. It is of course hubris to believe that humans
can at this point foresee all the ideas that all future
life forms will come up with to save themselves. In
the future, there may be many ways to work aroundthe basic premises we have here assumed. We list here
a few of the ones one can imagine. Perhaps Dyson’s
scaling hypothesis could be violated under the correct
conditions. Perhaps someday one can find a way to
create and use wormholes. Then we could either bring
in energy from far distant points in the universe for our
use, or we could travel to some other more congenial
place in the universe where there are still sufficient
resources for our consumption. Another alternative
would be to create a universe in a lab, along the lines
of suggestions made by Guth and Farhi [28], and then
move into it. Future beings are likely to apply new
technology and sophistication, far beyond anything we
can anticipate, towards these questions of survival.
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